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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Paula Jones’ appeal in her sexual harassment case against President Clinton came 
in the midst of the United States Supreme Court’s rulings in Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton1 and Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth2 which reiterated the standard 
for the determination of an actionable hostile work environment claim.  Even though 
Jones and Clinton settled on November 13, 1998 for $850,000.00,3 the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of hostile environment law would have had bearing on the success 
of Jones’ appeal.  This note demonstrates that a cognizable claim of sexual 
harassment may be predicated on a severe, yet isolated episode of sexual harassment.  
In this inquiry, we will look to other Supreme Court and Appellate Court decisions 
regarding sexual harassment law to support the conclusion that a single incident of 
                                                                
1118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). 
2118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). 
3Jones v. Clinton, 161 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 1998); What’s News, WALL ST.J., Nov. 16, 1998, 
at A1. 
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sexual harassment can constitute an actionable hostile work environment claim.  
Once this purview has been accomplished, it will become evident that the Eighth 
Circuit would have ruled in accordance with other courts of appeals in finding a 
single incident of sexual harassment actionable and would have ruled in favor of 
Paula Jones on her appeal. 
Part II traces the background of sexual harassment law, including what 
constitutes actionable discrimination and the applicable standards of a hostile work 
environment claim.  Part III outlines the Supreme Court’s analysis of actionable 
employment discrimination based on sexual harassment under Title VII, as well as 
the Court’s establishment of the employer liability standard.  Part IV explores the 
potential outcome of Paula Jones’ appeal in the Eighth Circuit if the Court were to  
find the single incident of sexual harassment upon which her case was premised as 
actionable.  Finally, Part V summarizes the previous sections and concludes that the 
Supreme Court’s reiteration of hostile environment law during the midst of Paula 
Jones’ appeal strengthened her claim of sexual harassment against President Clinton 
and would have warranted reversal of the dismissal of her case. 
II.  BACKGROUND OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 
A.  Title VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, in relevant part, that “it shall 
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”4  Title VII’s prohibition against discriminating because of sex in the terms 
and conditions of employment includes sexual harassment of any kind that meets the 
statutory requirements.5  An employee claiming sexual harassment is required to 
prove in a Title VII suit that such conduct was unwelcome, that the conduct was 
prompted simply because of the employee’s gender, and that the conduct was 
sufficiently pervasive to create an offensive environment in the workplace.6  Justice 
Ginsburg, in her concurring opinion in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., stated that 
“[t]he critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one sex are 
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of 
the other sex are not exposed.”7  
B.  Evolution of the Terms “Quid Pro Quo” and “Hostile Work Environment” in 
Sexual Harassment Law 
The development of sexual harassment law evolved into the utilization of 
primary terms of art.8  “Quid pro quo” sexual harassment and “hostile work 
environment” appear nowhere in the text of Title VII.  These terms first appeared in 
                                                                
442 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).   
5Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001 (1998).   
6See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986); see also Carrero v. New 
York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1998). 
7510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993). 
8Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2263 (1998). 
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academic literature and found their way into the decisions of the courts of appeals 
and then eventually were mentioned in the United States Supreme Court case 
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.9  Meritor’s use of “quid pro quo” sexual 
harassment and “hostile work environment” served the specific purpose of providing 
a framework for considering whether the conduct in question constituted 
discrimination, either explicitly or constructively, in the terms or conditions of 
employment in violation of Title VII.10  The Meritor Court announced that a 
violation of Title VII may be predicated on either type of sexual harassment.11 
Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when an employer alters an employee’s 
job conditions or withholds economic benefits because the employee refused to 
submit to the sexual demands of the employer.12  Sexual harassment of this kind 
results in the employer being held strictly liable for its employee’s unlawful acts.13  
Hostile work environment harassment, however, is less obvious.  A hostile work 
environment is created when an employer’s sexually demeaning behavior has 
severely or pervasively altered the terms or conditions of employment in violation of 
Title VII.14 
The language of Title VII is not limited to economic or tangible employment 
discrimination.15  Sexual harassment leading to noneconomic injury indeed violates 
Title VII under the “hostile work environment” theory.16  To state a claim under this 
theory, it must be shown that the workplace is permeated with discriminatory 
behavior that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an actionable hostile or 
abusive working environment.17 
Courts have interpreted this to mean that a single incident, if sufficiently severe, 
can give rise to a claim.18  In Torres v. Pisano,19 the Second Circuit explained that a 
single episode of harassment, if severe enough, can establish a hostile work 
                                                                
9477 U.S. at 57 (1986). 
10Id.  
11Id. 
12Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 577 (2d Cir. 1998).  See also 
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 62 (stating that quid pro quo sexual harassment involves the conditioning 
of concrete employment benefits on sexual favors).   
13Carrero, 890 F.2d at 579. 
14Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. 
15Id. at 64. 
16Id. at 65. 
17Id. at 67.  See also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) 
(explaining that conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile 
work environment, is beyond Title VII’s purview; this crucial requirement ensures that courts 
and juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the workplace, such as male on male 
horseplay or intersexual flirtation, for discriminatory conditions of employment). 
18Beiner, Theresa M., The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 77 (1999). 
19116 F.3d at 625, 631 n.4 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 997 (1997). 
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environment.20  The Eleventh Circuit has likewise supported the proposition that 
severe isolated incidents of harassment are actionable.21  In Vance, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that the “trial court incorrectly applied mechanically an absolute 
numerical standard to the number of acts of harassment which must be committed by 
the defendant before a jury may reasonably find that a hostile environment exists.”22  
Meritor supports the theory that discriminatory behavior that is sufficiently severe, 
although occurring only once, creates an actionable hostile work environment by 
virtue of its ruling that harassment may be predicated upon the severity or 
pervasiveness of the harassment.23 
The Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems24 reaffirmed and expanded upon 
Meritor’s standard for an actionable hostile work environment claim.25  The Court 
stated that “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, 
ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of 
the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment, Title VII is 
violated.”26  The Harris Court adopted both an objective and subjective approach to 
determine whether the harassment is actionable as a hostile work environment.27  
First, the conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile 
or abusive environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.28  
Secondly, the victim must subjectively perceive the environment as abusive.29  In 
analyzing the subjective aspect of a hostile work environment claim, the Court stated 
that “Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous 
breakdown.”30  The harassment need not seriously affect the plaintiff’s psychological 
well-being to be actionable.31  “So long as the environment would reasonably be 
perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be 
psychologically injurious.”32 
The Court in Harris noted that the objective/subjective test is not by its nature 
mathematically precise.33  The Court stated that “the determination of whether an 
environment is hostile or abusive can only be ascertained by looking to the all of the 
                                                                
20Id.; see also Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1274, n.4 (7th Cir. 1991). 
21
 Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511 (11th Cir. 1989). 
22Id.  
23Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).   
24510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
25Id. at 21.  
26Id. 
27Id. 
28Id. 
29Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. 
30Id. at 22. 
31Id. 
32Id. (citations omitted). 
33Id.   
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circumstances.”34  The Court further stated that “an analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances includes the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; 
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and 
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”35  The 
Court explained that “the effect on the employee’s psychological well being is 
relevant when determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment 
abusive.”36  Psychological harm, however like any other relevant factor, may be 
taken into account; but no single factor is required.37 
The Meritor Court’s discussion of “quid pro quo” and “hostile work 
environment” sexual harassment was a milestone in sexual harassment practice.  
Meritor’s use of these terms has had an enduring effect on litigation involving the 
determination of whether a discriminatory employment action has occurred in 
violation of Title VII.  The most recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
regarding sexual harassment law reaffirm the standard established in Meritor and 
expanded upon in Harris relating to hostile environments.38  The Court in Faragher 
and Ellerth states “that the terms ‘quid pro quo’ and ‘hostile work environment’ are 
helpful in making a rough demarcation in employer liability claims between cases in 
which threats are carried out and those where they are not or are absent altogether.”39  
The Court further explained that “the terms are relevant only when there is a 
threshold question of whether the plaintiff can prove discrimination in violation of 
Title VII; beyond this the terms are of limited utility.”40 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ellerth and Faragher not only reiterated the 
standard established in Harris, which determines unlawful discrimination, but also 
resolved the conflict in the Courts of Appeals over the appropriate standard for the 
imposition of vicarious liability for supervisory sexual harassment.41  In Ellerth and 
Faragher, the Court established that the initial step of the inquiry involves the 
determination of whether discrimination because of sex occurred in violation of Title 
VII.42  Once discrimination is proven, the next step of the inquiry determines whether 
vicarious liability may be imposed upon the employer for the supervisor’s actionable 
sexual harassment.43  The Court resolved the conflict in the lower courts by 
                                                                
34Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.    
35Id. at 23.  
36Id.   
37Id.  See also Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(delineating severity versus pervasiveness to determine that sexual harassment need not be so 
pervasive before actionable); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 
(1986) (stating that the determination of sexual harassment is done in light of the totality of the 
circumstances). 
38Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2283 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2265 (1998). 
39Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2264.  
40Id. 
41Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2283, 2293; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2265, 2270. 
42Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2263. 
43Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2290. 
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establishing the proper employer liability standard to be utilized when addressing the 
second aspect of the analysis. 
III.  ELLERTH AND FARAGHER:  THE SUPREME COURT REITERATES HARRIS AND 
REAFFIRMS HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT LAW 
The facts in both Ellerth and Faragher indicate that the plaintiffs were sexually 
harassed by their supervisors yet suffered no adverse, tangible job detriments.44  In 
Ellerth, the harassed employee quit her job after fifteen months as a salesperson in 
one of the employer’s, Burlington Industries’, many divisions, allegedly because she 
had been subjected to constant sexual harassment by one of her supervisors.45  In the 
hierarchy of Burlington’s management, the harassing supervisor was a mid-level 
manager who had the authority to make hiring and promotion decisions.46  Ellerth’s 
supervisor made repeated unwelcome, boorish and offensive remarks and gestures 
towards Ellerth, yet she suffered no tangible retaliation and was, in fact, promoted 
once.47  Ellerth never informed anyone in authority about the supervisor’s conduct, 
despite knowing Burlington had a policy against sexual harassment.48   
In Faragher, the claimant worked while attending college, and during the 
summers, worked as an ocean lifeguard for the City of Boca Raton.49  She alleges 
that her supervisors created a sexually hostile atmosphere at the beach by repeatedly 
subjecting Faragher and other female lifeguards to uninvited and offensive touching, 
by making lewd remarks, and by speaking of women in offensive terms.50  One of 
the harassing supervisors involved was the Chief of the Marine Safety Division and 
had the authority to hire new lifeguards, to supervise all aspects of the lifeguards’ 
work assignments, to engage in counseling, to deliver oral reprimands, and to make a 
record of any such discipline.51  The other supervisor involved was a Marine Safety 
lieutenant who was responsible for making the lifeguards’ daily assignments, and for 
supervising their work and fitness training.52  Although the City adopted a sexual 
harassment policy, it failed to disseminate its policy among the Marine Safety 
Section, including the supervisors involved here.53 
During the five-year period that Faragher was employed as a lifeguard, her 
supervisors made crude demeaning references to women generally, and made vulgar 
comments regarding the bodies of female lifeguards and beachgoers.54  One of 
                                                                
44Id. at 2281; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2262. 
45Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2262. 
46Id. 
47Id. 
48Id.  
49Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2280. 
50Id. 
51Id.  
52Id.  
53Id.  
54Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2281. 
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Faragher’s supervisors made disparaging comments about her shape and told her, but 
for a physical characteristic he found unattractive, he would readily have had sexual 
relations with her.55  Despite the harassing behavior of Faragher’s supervisors, she 
never complained to higher management, although she spoke of their behavior to 
another non-harassing supervisor who did not report her complaints to any higher 
authority.56  Faragher resigned after five years of employment, during which time she 
never suffered any tangible job action for her refusals to welcome the sexual 
harassment of her supervisors.57 
A.  Proof of Discrimination Because of Sex Necessary for Violation of Title VII 
The Supreme Court in Faragher and Ellerth began its analysis of establishing an 
actionable claim for sexual harassment by reiterating the necessity of proving that 
the sexual harassment was discrimination because of one’s sex.  The Court initially 
stated that the terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment are of limited utility 
in determining whether discriminatory sexual harassment occurred.58  To the extent 
that the terms illustrate the distinction between cases involving a carried-out threat 
and offensive conduct in general, they are relevant when there is a threshold question 
of whether a plaintiff can prove discrimination in violation of Title VII.59  The 
purpose of the terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment, the Court 
explained, is to instruct that Title VII is violated by either explicit or constructive 
alterations in the terms or conditions of employment.60  When a plaintiff proves that 
a tangible employment action resulted from a refusal to submit to a supervisor’s 
sexual demands, he or she establishes that the employment decision itself constitutes 
a change in the terms or conditions of employment that is actionable under Title 
VII.61  The Court further explained that for any sexual harassment preceding the 
employment decision to be actionable, the conduct must be severe or pervasive.62 
In analyzing severe or pervasive harassment that creates a hostile work 
environment, the Court relied on Harris’s ruling that a sexually objectionable 
environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a 
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did 
perceive to be so.63  The Court emphasized the use of looking at the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive 
as done in Harris.64  The Court further explained that simple teasing, offhand 
                                                                
55Id. 
56Id. 
57Id. 
58Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2264. 
59Id. at 2265. 
60Id. at 2264. 
61Id. at 2265. 
62Id. 
63Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2283. 
64Id. 
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comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to 
discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.65  Once 
discrimination is proven, however, the factors surrounding the imposition of 
employer liability, not the categories of quid pro quo and hostile work environment, 
control on the issue of vicarious liability.66 
In applying the principles for determining whether actionable discrimination 
occurred in violation of Title VII to Ellerth and Faragher, the Court found 
actionable sexual harassment in both cases.67  The Court affirmed the district court 
ruling in Faragher that the degree of hostility in the work environment rose to the 
actionable level to be deemed sufficiently severe and pervasive.68  Faragher’s 
supervisors sexually harassed her during her entire five-year period of employment.69  
The Court found Faragher’s workplace to be permeated with pervasive sexual 
discriminatory behavior in violation of Title VII.70  The Supreme Court in Ellerth 
accepted the district court ruling that the alleged sexual conduct was severe or 
pervasive.71  Ellerth pointed to incidents during her employment which contributed 
to the creation of a hostile work environment.72  Ellerth’s supervisor made 
unsolicited remarks about her breasts, rubbed her knee, inquired as to what she was 
wearing and encouraged her to wear shorter skirts.73  The Court found in Ellerth that 
the discrimination was sufficiently pervasive in violation of Title VII.74 
A sense of permanence in the area of hostile environmental law has emerged 
from the Ellerth and Faragher Supreme Court decisions.  A sound contemporary 
example of the application of hostile environment law, originating in Harris and then 
reaffirmed in Faragher and Ellerth, would have been in Paula Jones’ appeal of her 
sexual harassment claim against President Clinton.  If the Eighth Circuit had the 
opportunity to rule on Jones’ claim of sexual harassment based on a hostile work 
environment theory, the Court most likely would have found for Jones and reversed 
the grant of summary judgment to President Clinton. 
                                                                
65Id. 
66Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2265. 
67Id. at 2271; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293. 
68Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293. 
69Id. at 2281. 
70Id. at 2293. 
71Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2265. 
72Id. at 2262. 
73Id. 
74Id. at 2265. 
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IV.  JONES V. CLINTON: EIGHTH CIRCUIT WOULD HAVE REVERSED DISMISSAL OF 
ACTION 
A.  Grant of Summary Judgment in the District Court Proceedings 
Paula Jones’ claim of sexual harassment against President Clinton was based on 
an incident said to have taken place on the afternoon of May 8, 1991, in a suite at the 
Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock, Arkansas.75  President Clinton was Governor of the 
State of Arkansas at the time, and the plaintiff was a State employee with the 
Arkansas Industrial Development Commission (“AIDC”), having begun her State 
employment on March 11, 1991.76  On the day in question, then-Governor Clinton 
was at the Excelsior Hotel delivering a speech at an official conference being 
sponsored by the AIDC.77  Jones stated that she and another AIDC employee, Pamela 
Blackard, were working at a registration desk for the AIDC when a man approached 
the desk and informed her and Blackard that he was Trooper Danny Ferguson, the 
Governor’s bodyguard with the Arkansas State Police.78  They proceeded to make 
small talk in a friendly manner and then Ferguson returned to the Governor.79  Upon 
leaving the registration desk, Ferguson apparently had a conversation with the 
Governor about the possibility of meeting with Jones, during which Ferguson stated 
that the Governor remarked that she had “that come-hither look,” i.e. “a sort of 
[sexually] suggestive appearance from the look or dress.”80  The facts further 
indicated that the Governor asked Ferguson to get him a room because he had phone 
calls to make and also to tell Jones that if she wanted to meet him that she could 
come up to his hotel room.81  Ferguson later reappeared at the registration desk, 
delivered Jones a piece of paper to her with a four-digit number written on it, and 
said that the Governor would like to meet with her in that suite.82 
Upon arriving at the suite and announcing herself, the Governor shook her hand, 
invited her in, and closed the door.83  A few minutes of small talk ensued, which 
included the Governor asking her about her job and him mentioning that Dave 
Harrington, Jones’ ultimate superior within the AIDC and a Clinton appointee, was 
his good friend.84  The Governor then reached over to her, took her hand, and pulled 
her toward him, so that their bodies were close to each other.85  Jones stated that she 
removed her hand from his and retreated several feet, but that Clinton approached 
                                                                
75Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp 657, 662-63 (E.D. Ark. 1998). 
76Id. at 663. 
77Id. 
78Id. 
79Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 663. 
80Id. 
81Id. 
82Id. 
83Id. 
84Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 663. 
85Id. at 664. 
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her again and, while saying, “I love the way your hair flows down you back” and “I 
love your curves,” put his hand on her leg, and started sliding it toward her pelvic 
area, bent down to attempt to kiss her on her neck, all without her consent.86  Jones 
stated that she exclaimed, “what are you doing?,” told the Governor that she was 
“not that kind of girl,” and “escaped” from the Governor’s reach “by walking away 
from him.”87  She stated that she was extremely upset and confused and, not knowing 
what to do, attempted to distract the Governor by chatting about his wife.88  Jones 
stated that she sat down at the end of the sofa nearest the door, but that the Governor 
approached the sofa where she had taken a seat and, as he sat down, “lowered his 
trousers and underwear, exposed his penis (which was erect) and told [her] to ‘kiss 
it.’”89  She stated that she was “horrified” by this and that she “jumped up from the 
couch” and told the Governor that she had to go, saying something to the effect that 
she had to get back to the registration desk.90  Jones further stated that the Governor, 
“while fondling his penis,” said, “well, I don’t want to make you do anything you 
don’t want to do,” and then pulled up his pants and said, “if you get into trouble for 
leaving work, have Dave call me immediately and I’ll take care of it.”91  She also 
stated that as she left the room (the door of which was not locked), the Governor 
“detained” her momentarily, “looked sternly” at her, and said, “You are smart.  Let’s 
keep this between ourselves.”92 
The Governor’s advances towards Jones were unwelcomed and she stated that 
when the Governor referred to Dave Harrington, she understood that he had control 
over Mr. Harrington and over her job, and that he was willing to use that power.93  
She also stated that she was very fearful that her refusal to submit to the Governor’s 
advances could damage her career and even jeopardize her employment.94 
Jones continued to work at AIDC following the alleged incident in the hotel 
suite.95  One of her duties was to deliver documents to and from the Office of the 
Governor, as well as other offices around the Arkansas State Capitol.96  On one 
occasion, Jones claimed that Clinton “accosted” her in the Rotunda of the Arkansas 
State Capitol when he “draped his arm over her, pulled her close to him and held her 
tightly to his body,” and said to his bodyguard, “Don’t we make a beautiful couple: 
Beauty and the Beast?”97  Jones additionally stated that on an unspecified date, she 
                                                                
86Id. 
87Id.  
88Id. 
89Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 664. 
90Id. 
91Id. 
92Id. 
93Id. 
94Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 664. 
95Id. at 665. 
96Id. 
97Id. 
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was waiting in the Governor’s outer office on a delivery run when the Governor 
entered the office, patted her on the shoulder, and in a “friendly fashion” said, “how 
are you doing, Paula?”98 
Jones stated that she continued to work at AIDC even though she was in constant 
fear that the Governor would retaliate against her because she refused to have sex 
with him.99  She claimed that this fear prevented her from enjoying her job.100  She 
further stated that she was treated very rudely by certain supervisors in AIDC, 
including her direct supervisor, Clydine Pennington, and that the rude treatment had 
not happened prior to her encounter with the Governor.101  Jones finally terminated 
her employment with AIDC voluntarily on February 20, 1993, to move to California 
with her husband, who had been transferred.102   
Jones brought her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against former Governor 
Clinton, alleging that he, acting under color of state law, deprived her of her 
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution by sexually harassing her.103  A § 1983 sexual 
harassment claim should be analyzed under the standards developed in similar Title 
VII litigation.104 Paula Jones sued Clinton individually as the Governor acting under  
color of state law, hence the use of § 1983 as the basis of her claim.  Even though 
Ellerth and Faragher discuss the imposition of employer liability for supervisory 
sexual harassment, vicarious liability is not relevant under Jones’ claim since she is 
suing Clinton individually.  However, the fact that Ellerth and Faragher reaffirmed 
the hostile environment standard announced in Harris is relevant to finding proof 
that Clinton unlawfully discriminated against Jones because of her sex.  Therefore, 
Jones’ claim should be analyzed under the Title VII sexual harassment law relating 
to actionable hostile work environments already discussed throughout this note. 
In its opinion the Eastern District Court of Arkansas per Judge Susan Webber 
Wright, separated the quid pro quo claims of sexual harassment from hostile work 
environment claims and held that Jones had failed to establish either, thus granting 
summary judgment to President Clinton on her sexual harassment claims.105  The 
district court ruled that a showing of job detriment or adverse employment action 
was an essential element to a § 1983 claim based on quid pro quo sexual harassment 
                                                                
98Id. 
99Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 665. 
100Id. 
101Id. 
102Id. at 666. 
103Id. 
104Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140, 1140 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that a claim of sexual 
harassment under § 1983 must generally satisfy the contours of a sexual harassment claim 
under Title VII); Leon Friedman, Relationship Between Title VII, Section 1981, 1983, 1985, 
ADEA, The Equal Pay Act, and State Causes of Action for Employment Discrimination, SC59 
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 277 (1998) (explaining the congressional intention to allow an overlap between 
Title VII and Section 1983 causes of action for all public employees). 
105Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 674, 676. 
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law.106  Jones did not demonstrate any tangible job detriment for her refusal to submit 
to the Governor’s advances; therefore, the district court held that she could not 
establish a cognizable claim.107  The district court further held that Clinton’s conduct 
was not so severe or pervasive that it could have been said to alter the conditions of 
Jones’ employment and create an abusive work environment.108  The court further 
noted that this case was “not one of those exceptional cases in which a single 
incident of sexual harassment, such as sexual assault, was deemed sufficient to state 
a claim of hostile work environment.”109  The court opined that “while the alleged 
incident in the hotel, if true, was certainly boorish and offensive, the Court has 
already found that the Governor’s alleged conduct does not constitute sexual 
assault.”110  The district court effectively required a showing of sexual assault before 
holding a single incident of sexual harassment as an actionable hostile work 
environment.111 
Paula Jones appealed the district court’s dismissal of her case to the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, focusing on whether a single episode of severe sexual 
harassment constitutes discrimination under Title VII.  During the period between 
the district court ruling and oral argument set for October 20, 1998 in the Eighth 
Circuit, the Supreme Court ruled on Ellerth and Faragher which altered the standard 
of analysis for sexual harassment claims and their effect on employer liability.  The 
parties settled, however, on November 17, 1998, after oral argument but before any 
ruling by the Eighth Circuit.112  The Eighth Circuit has yet to have another 
opportunity to rule on a similar case claiming discriminatory sexual harassment 
based on a single incident under the severity test of actionable hostile work 
environment. 
B.  Likelihood of Success of Jones’ Claim for Actionable Hostile Work Environment 
if the Eighth Circuit had the Opportunity to Rule on her Claim 
After the district court ruling in Jones’ case granting summary judgment to 
President Clinton and prior to oral argument of the appeal, the Eighth Circuit held 
that conduct not nearly as severe as that alleged of Clinton was a triable question for 
the jury, thus precluding summary judgment on a hostile work environment claim.113  
                                                                
106Id. at 674. 
107Id. (examples of lack of tangible job detriment included the discouragement from 
seeking more attractive jobs and reclassification and the fact that Jones job was changed to 
one with fewer responsibilities when the there was no diminution in salary). 
108Id. at 675. 
109Id. 
110Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 675; see e.g., Crisonino v. New York Housing Auth., 985 F. 
Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (supervisor called plaintiff a “dumb bitch” and “shoved her so 
hard that she fell backward and hit the floor, sustaining injuries from which she has yet to fully 
recover.”)  The Crisonino case was used by the District Court in Jones to illustrate an example 
of sexual assault sufficient enough to constitute a claim of hostile work environment for a 
single incident of sexual harassment.  Id. 
111Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 675. 
112Jones v. Clinton, 161 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 1998). 
113Rorie v. United Parcel Service, 151 F.3d 757, 762 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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In Rorie, the Eighth Circuit conceded that the facts in that case were on the 
borderline of those sufficient to support a claim of sexual harassment.114  However, 
the Court stated that it could not “say that a supervisor who pats a female on the 
back, brushes up against her, and tells her that she smells good does not constitute 
sexual harassment as a matter of law.”115  The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 
supervisor’s behavior, coupled with his other lewd comments, presented a jury 
question as to the pervasiveness of the hostile environment.116  
If the Eighth Circuit had the opportunity to rule on Jones’ appeal concerning 
whether an actionable hostile environment existed in light of Rorie, Clinton’s 
conduct would have risen to the level of actionable discrimination.  The facts as 
alleged by Jones and taken as true for purposes of evaluating the summary judgment 
motion, indicate that Clinton exposed himself to Jones; that on another occasion, he 
draped his arm over Jones and pulled her close to him and held her body tightly to 
his; and that on another occasion, he allegedly patted her shoulder.117  The facts in 
Rorie, which warranted a trial, are not nearly as severe or pervasive as the facts 
relating to the sexual harassment in Jones.  The President’s offensive conduct 
towards Jones in exposing himself in the Excelsior Hotel suite, coupled with the 
other alleged incidents of sexual harassment, would have lead the Eighth Circuit, in 
adhering to precedent, to reverse the dismissal in the district court and allow Jones’ 
claim of actionable hostile environment to go to the jury.  Clinton’s conduct, like that 
in Rorie, was sufficiently pervasive in that it permeated Jones’ workplace with 
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult creating a hostile work environment. 
Given that the Eighth Circuit in Rorie found facts that border on those sufficient 
to support a claim of pervasive sexual harassment as triable questions for the jury, a 
logical extension of Rorie would be to find severe, yet isolated, incidents of sexual 
harassment as triable questions as well.  The chances of success in Jones’ claim on 
appeal for actionable hostile work environment would have been high based on the 
likelihood of the Eighth Circuit holding a single isolated incident of sexual 
harassment as discriminatory.  Jones argued in her appellate brief to the Eighth 
Circuit that “the events at the Excelsior Hotel by themselves are sufficient to support 
a claim for sexual harassment.”118  The United States Supreme Court noted in Ellerth 
that they “express no opinion as to whether a single unfulfilled threat is sufficient to 
constitute discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment.”119  In Faragher, 
however, the Supreme Court stated “that simple teasing, offhand comments, and 
isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory 
changes in the terms or conditions of employment.”120  The Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the determination of a hostile work environment is determined 
                                                                
114Id. at 762. 
115Id. 
116Id. 
117Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 664, 665. 
118Brief for Appellant at 24, (No. 98-2161) (visited Apr. 29, 1999) 
<http://www.law.csuohio.edu/lawlibrary/usgovernment/judgepage.htm>. 
119Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2265 (1998). 
120Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2283 (1998). 
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by looking at all of the circumstances, which may include the frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct, its severity, and whether it is physically threatening or 
humiliating.121  These Supreme Court rulings may be interpreted to support the 
proposition that a severe and extremely serious single incident of sexual harassment 
is actionable as a hostile environment. 
About half of the Federal courts of appeals, excluding the Eighth Circuit, have 
held a single isolated incident of sexual harassment as actionable under the hostile 
work environment theory.122  Some of the appellate courts have utilized a frequency 
versus severity test to hold the proposition that a single episode of sexual harassment 
can support a Title VII claim.123  The Ninth Circuit has explained this test by noting 
“that the required showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies 
inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.”124  In Carrero, the 
Second Circuit delineated between severity versus pervasiveness to determine that 
discriminatory sexual harassment need not be so pervasive before becoming 
actionable as a hostile work environment.125  Jones’ claim of sexual harassment 
based on the single incident in the Excelsior Hotel analyzed under the frequency 
versus severity test at least merits a reversal by the Eighth Circuit, if it were to rule a 
single episode as actionable hostile environment.126 
Other courts of appeals have flatly held a single incident of sexual harassment as 
actionable.  The Second Circuit held that even a single incident of sexual harassment 
can in some circumstances suffice to state a claim of hostile work environment.127  
The Second Circuit actually ruled a single incident sufficient to withstand summary 
judgment, but the plaintiff’s alleged severe sexual harassment was rape.128  “While 
rape clearly is a severe form of harassment, something less than that should be 
actionable.  Obviously, conduct that falls short of this could alter the ‘terms, 
conditions, or privileges’ of plaintiff’s employment.”129  The Tenth Circuit has ruled 
                                                                
121Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
122See e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Products, Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995); 
Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 631 (2d Cir. 1997); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 
1264, 1274 (7th Cir. 1991); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Creamer v. 
Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 86 F.3d 167 (10th Cir. 1996); Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 
863 F.2d 1503, 1511 (11th Cir. 1989). 
123Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878. 
124Id.; see also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sam & Sons Produce Co., 
Inc., 872 F. Supp. 29 (W.D.N.Y. 1994). 
125Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1998). 
126
 Robert L. Jackson, Lewinsky could Reappear in Jones Appeal; Courts: Federal Panel 
Considering whether to Revive Sexual Harassment Case Indicates that Clinton’s Trysts with 
Intern might “Become an Issue”, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1998, at A18 (indicating by the 
questions posed by appellate judges of the Eighth Circuit to Clinton’s attorneys during oral 
argument that the Court might find that a severe isolated incident of sexual harassment to be 
discriminatory). 
127Torres, 116 F.3d at 631. 
128Tomaka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1995). 
129Beiner, supra note 18, at 112, n. 266. 
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“that an employee may prevail . . . if there was only a single incident of harassment 
which, standing alone, was sufficiently ‘severe’.”130  The First Circuit is in 
accordance with these other circuits when it explained that “we do not hold that a 
one-time episode is per se incapable of sustaining a hostile environment claim.  The 
frequency of the alleged harassment is . . . only one of [the] many [factors] to be 
considered.”131 
The Seventh Circuit, in determining the objective severity of harassment, has 
focused this inquiry on “the line that separates the merely vulgar and mildly 
offensive from the deeply offensive and sexually harassing.”132  The Seventh Circuit 
went on to explain further that “on the [sexual harassment] side lie sexual assaults; 
other physical contact, whether amorous or hostile, for which there is no consent 
express or implied; uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating words or acts; 
obscene language or gestures; pornographic pictures.”133  Rulings in other circuits 
would support the Eighth Circuit in also holding a single incident of sexual 
harassment as sufficiently severe to be actionable under hostile environment basis of 
sexual harassment.  If the Eighth Circuit were to adopt this holding, then Jones’ 
chance of success on appeal regarding her claim of the existence of actionable sexual 
harassment would have been high. 
Some district court decisions support the finding of sexual harassment predicated 
on severe isolated incidents.  In Roberts v. Signature Group, Inc.,134 the court listed 
isolated activities that have commonly been held to constitute hostile work 
environments.135  The list included “touching the plaintiff, explicitly or implicitly 
inviting the plaintiff to have sex with him or go out on a date with him, making any 
verbal threats, exposing himself to the plaintiff, or engaging in his alleged 
misconduct in a non-public place.”136  Another district court has held that it was a 
question of fact as to whether a supervisor created a single-incident hostile work 
environment by forcibly kissing the plaintiff and touching her breasts during a closed 
door meeting in the his office.137  The court focused on the setting of the alleged 
sexual harassment and explained that sexual acts that take place behind closed doors 
in non-social settings are objectively more abusive.138 
Some courts of appeals, however, still require more than one incident of sexual 
harassment to support a claim of hostile work environment.  The Eighth Circuit is 
one of these appellate courts.  It seems that the Eighth Circuit has rejected the totality 
of the circumstances test to determine actionable discrimination as set forth by the 
                                                                
130Creamer v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 86 F.3d 167, 170 (10th Cir. 1996). 
131Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Products, Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 541 (1st Cir. 1995). 
132Baskerville v. Cullingan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995). 
133Id. at 430. 
134No. 95-2501-JWL, 1996 WL 707106, (D. Kan. Nov. 14, 1996). 
135Id. at *4. 
136Id. 
137Fall v. Indiana Univ. Board of Trustees, 12 F. Supp. 2d 870, 880 (N.D. Ind. 1998). 
138Id. at 86-87. 
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United States Supreme Court.139  The Eighth Circuit held in a racial harassment case 
that it disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument that a court must look to the totality of 
the circumstances to determine whether the working environment is free of a racially 
hostile atmosphere.140  The court found the single incident of harassment in Clayton 
as insufficient to state a Title VII claim.141  
It is important to note that Clayton was decided in 1989, a pre-Harris decision, 
which was ruled on in 1993.142  With Jones’ appeal, the Eighth Circuit would have 
had an opportunity to align itself with Harris and more carefully apply the totality of 
the circumstances analysis, focusing on severity as an legitimate factor.  The Eighth 
Circuit needs to comply with the law as articulated by the Supreme Court by 
adhering to the totality of the circumstances test. 
If the Eighth Circuit aligns itself with the other courts of appeals in holding a 
single incident as actionable sexual harassment, then Jones would have had the 
opportunity to prevail on her claim that the incident with Clinton in the Excelsior 
Hotel was sufficiently severe to create a hostile environment. If the Eighth Circuit 
were to require more than one incident of sexual harassment when ruling on Jones’ 
appeal, Jones would still have a chance of success by virtue of the precedent set in 
Rorie.  The overall likelihood of Jones’ success in her appeal for actionable hostile 
work environment would have been high, considering the Eighth Circuit’s precedent 
and trend in other circuits in finding actionable sexual harassment for severe isolated 
incidents of harassment. 
The likelihood of the Eighth Circuit reversing the dismissal of Jones’ claim is 
heightened once the facts, as alleged by Jones and taken as true for purposes of 
evaluating summary judgement, are applied to relevant hostile work environment 
standards enunciated in Harris.  Jones claimed that Clinton’s discriminatory 
behavior in exposing himself to her in the hotel suite was sufficiently severe.143  
When looking to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident in the 
hotel suite, Clinton’s conduct may be deemed objectively hostile.144  Clinton not only 
exposed himself to Jones, he also asked her to “kiss it.”145  During the same incident 
while alone in the hotel suite, Clinton “put his hand on her leg, and started sliding it 
toward her pelvic area, [and] bent down to attempt to kiss her on her neck.”146  His 
conduct, while maybe not physically threatening, was humiliating. 
As to the issue of whether Clinton’s conduct was severe, the context of the 
alleged sexual harassment is key in determining whether the incident qualifies as 
severe enough to be actionable.147  One court concluded that an isolated incident of 
                                                                
139Gloria Allred & John S. West, Employment Law Sexual Harassment, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 
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touching and grabbing the plaintiff’s posterior was not the type of severe conduct 
that a reasonable person would consider a hostile working environment.148  In Jones’ 
context, however, a reasonable person might find Clinton’s conduct severe.  Clinton 
not only offensively touched Jones, he also exposed himself to her and suggested 
that she perform oral sex.  Although a reasonable person might find offensive 
touching not severe, once coupled with the uninvited exposing of himself, that same 
reasonable person probably would consider the latter conduct to be severe and find a 
hostile environment. 
Once the determination is made that Clinton’s conduct is objectively hostile, 
Jones must have subjectively perceived the environment as abusive in order to claim 
an actionable hostile work environment.  Jones perceived the environment as hostile 
as evidenced by her testimony that she was extremely upset and horrified by 
Clinton’s conduct.149  Even though there are no facts indicating that Jones sought 
counseling after the hotel incident, the harassment need not affect the plaintiff’s 
psychological well-being to be actionable.150  The Eighth Circuit has ruled that it was 
sufficient for a plaintiff to testify credibly that she felt afraid, intimidatd, and anxious 
and that those feelings had a detrimental impact on her psychological well-being to 
satisfy the subjective aspect.151  Given that Jones can fulfill both the objective and 
subjective requirements of an actionable hostile work environment claim, the Eight 
Circuit would probably rule in favor of Jones and let her case go to the jury.  As long 
as Jones can show that Clinton’s discriminatory behavior was sufficiently severe to 
create an actionable hostile work environment, the fact that the harassment occurred 
only once does not diminish her claim of sexual harassment. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Ellerth and Faragher, the United States Supreme Court’s most recent decisions 
in the area of sexual harassment law, reiterate the principles set forth in Harris 
regarding the parameters of hostile work environment claims.152  The established 
principles of hostile environment law permit claims of sexual harassment predicated 
on isolated, yet severe incidents.153  The application of hostile environment law as 
developed by the courts to Paula Jones’ appeal of her sexual harassment case against 
President Clinton would have resulted in reversal of the dismissal of her case in the 
Eighth Circuit.  Clinton’s conduct was sufficiently severe to be deemed actionable 
sexual harassment, even though the harassment culminated on a single occasion. 
 
MOIRA MCANDREW 
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